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Abstract
Background: The principles of biomedical ethics – autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice – are of
paradigmatic importance for framing ethical problems in medicine and for teaching ethics to medical students and
professionals. In order to underline this significance, Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress base the principles
in the common morality, i.e. they claim that the principles represent basic moral values shared by all persons
committed to morality and are thus grounded in human moral psychology. We empirically investigated the
relationship of the principles to other moral and non-moral values that provide orientations in medicine. By way of
comparison, we performed a similar analysis for the business & finance domain.
Methods: We evaluated the perceived degree of “morality” of 14 values relevant to medicine (n1 = 317, students and
professionals) and 14 values relevant to business & finance (n2 = 247, students and professionals). Ratings were made
along four dimensions intended to characterize different aspects of morality.
Results: We found that compared to other values, the principles-related values received lower ratings across several
dimensions that characterize morality. By interpreting our finding using a clustering and a network analysis approach,
we suggest that the principles can be understood as “bridge values” that are connected both to moral and non-moral
aspects of ethical dilemmas in medicine. We also found that the social domain (medicine vs. business & finance)
influences the degree of perceived morality of values.
Conclusions: Our results are in conflict with the common morality hypothesis of Beauchamp and Childress, which
would imply domain-independent high morality ratings of the principles. Our findings support the suggestions by
other scholars that the principles of biomedical ethics serve primarily as instruments in deliberated justifications, but lack
grounding in a universal “common morality”. We propose that the specific manner in which the principles are taught
and discussed in medicine – namely by referring to conflicts requiring a balancing of principles – may partly explain
why the degree of perceived “morality” of the principles is lower compared to other moral values.
Keywords: Autonomy, Beneficence, Business and finance, Common morality, Justice, Medicine, Moral psychology,
Moral values, Non-maleficence, Principlism
Background
The “Principles of Biomedical Ethics” by Tom L.
Beauchamp and James F. Childress, which appeared for
the first time in 1977, is a classic text in biomedical
ethics. The authors’ contribution has been celebrated as
one of the most important methodological inventions of
modern practical ethics, particularly in Anglophone
scholarship [1]. The core features of this so-called
principlism are to locate moral principles (autonomy,
non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice) pertinent to
a particular moral situation and to use specification,
balancing and (deductive) application to create a bridge
between the moral situation and the relevant principles.
In addition, the authors adopt a prescriptive common
morality thesis as a theoretical justification for the meth-
odological reasoning within principlism. This grounding
* Correspondence: christen@ethik.uzh.ch
†Equal contributors
1University Research Priority Program Ethics, University of Zurich, Zurich,
Switzerland
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2014 Christen et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.
Christen et al. BMC Medical Ethics 2014, 15:47
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/15/47
of the principles in the common morality was emphasized
in later editions. At the beginning of the most recent 7th
edition, published in 2013, Beauchamp and Childress state
that the common morality “refers to norms about right
and wrong human conduct that are so widely shared that
they form a stable social compact” ([2], p. 3). Thus, the
common morality is not merely a specific morality, in con-
trast to other moralities, but is rather applicable to all per-
sons in all places, and we rightly judge all human conduct
by its standards. Examples include situations in which, for
example, one knows not to lie, not to steal property, to
keep promises, to respect the rights of others, not to kill
or not to cause harm to innocent persons, and the like
([2], p. 3; [3]). It has been argued that there is far more
consensus on common morality principles and rules than
on any other moral theories. Hence, appealing to norms
of the common morality will work better for practical
decision-making [4].
However, principlism is not undisputed in bioethics.
Its virtues are clarity, simplicity and universality, but its
vices include neglect of emotional and personal factors
that are inherent in specific decision situations, oversim-
plification of the issues, and excessive claims of univer-
sality [5]. The main focus of the critique concerns the
completeness of the approach with respect to its prac-
tical use for dealing with moral problems in clinical
practice given the challenge of ethical pluralism [6].
Opinions are conflicting in this regard. In support of
principlism, Gillon [7] argues that the principles enable
a clinician (and anybody else) to link professional guid-
ance and rules with ethical aspects. They also allow new
situations to be confronted in the light of these accept-
able principles. There is some empirical support that the
daily work of physicians and other professionals in bio-
medicine indeed reflects these four principles [8]. Others
[9], however, argue that the principlist model is unre-
flective of how ethical decisions are taken in clinical
practice and that the model is neither sufficiently action-
guiding nor explicit about how to attain professional
integrity. For example, based on an analysis of the com-
munication process with Muslim parents, Westra and
colleagues [10] concluded that the parties involved in
disagreement may feel committed to seemingly similar,
but actually quite different principles. In such cases,
communication in terms of the principles may create a
conflict within an apparently common conceptual frame-
work. Page [11] found that psychology students value the
principles but do not actually seem to use them directly
in the decision-making process, which partly calls into
question their practical relevance.
Despite such findings, the common morality has been
emphasized by Beauchamp and Childress as the ultim-
ate source of moral norms since the 5th edition of the
“Principles of Biomedical Ethics” [4]. Karlsen and Solbakk
[12] observed that with the publication of the 6th edi-
tion, the authors not only attempted to ground their
theory in the common morality, but that there was also
an increased tendency to align the former with the lat-
ter. While this strategy may give the impression of a
more robust, and hence stable, foundation for the the-
oretical construct of principlism, Karlsen and Solbakk
argue that this comes at the expense of theoretical and
practical open-mindedness. In line with this reasoning,
Beauchamp and Childress suggested that the question
of whether the principles are indeed part of the com-
mon morality should be an object of empirical inquiry
([2], p. 416). Our research seeks to provide a first step
of an empirical investigation of the common morality.
An empirical investigation of the common morality
For the purpose of the empirical investigation, we
suggest making use of research in moral psychology. We
posit that moral values or principles “so widely shared
that they form a stable social compact” ([2], p. 3) are
grounded in psychological processes that allow us to
recognize that these values are at stake, and to align
decisions and actions with these values. Furthermore, to
the extent that these processes and values share some
degree of universality, they are built into us by evolution.
For example, beneficence or caring for others might be
seen as being products of natural selection, adapted to
allow survival [13].
In the following, we focus on those findings in moral
research that align with the universality claim of the
common morality in order to identify “dimensions” of
morality that can then be empirically investigated. The
findings posit that people have nearly instant reactions
to situations of moral violations [14-16], indicating that
moral concepts are “chronically accessible” [17] mental
representations. This foundation of morality in human
psychology developed to solve problems that faced our
ancestors for millions of years. For example, generosity
and sharing developed due to extreme mutual inter-
dependence [18]. One can therefore expect that the
common morality has a rich and long history of heritage
across and beyond the hominid line [19], supporting the
universality claim. Moreover, cognitive approaches of
moral psychology, e.g. the moral-conventional distinc-
tion model of Turiel [20], have emphasized universal as-
pects of morality in the sense that the moral wrongness
of an action does not depend on specific circumstances.
However, beyond universality, current research in moral
psychology and anthropology points out two further
dimensions of morality, namely community orientation
and cooperation [18]. Thus, it is plausible to relate the
common morality, which should be “shared by all per-
sons committed to morality” ([2], p. 3), to the features
universality, community orientation and cooperation.
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Certainly, there is also a line of research within moral
psychology emphasizing the cultural and social ground-
ing of morality, which calls this universality claim into
question and tends to align with the tradition of moral
relativism within philosophy [21]. Thus, an empirical
investigation of the values that are claimed to be part of
the common morality should also include a cross-cultural
and/or cross-social comparison.
Research goals
The aim of the present research is twofold. First, we
wish to empirically examine the extent to which various
values are considered to be moral values and whether
this evaluation is characterized by the features of univer-
sality, communion and cooperation orientation. With
the term ‘value’, we refer to stable beliefs about desirable
states or conducts of behaviors, which serve as norma-
tive standards to assess and justify actions [22,23]. Sec-
ond, we wish to test whether these evaluations of values
generalize across different social domains. In doing so,
we compare this evaluation in two domains: medicine
and business & finance. We hypothesize that morality
ratings coincide strongly with the features of universality,
communion and cooperation orientation, and that these
relations persist across different social domains. From this
hypothesis, we deduce that: If the values that relate to the
principles are, as expected, commonly characterized by
these features, and if these evaluations persist across social
domains of application, we have support for the claim that
the principles are part of the common morality. If this is
not the case, we have a conflicting result that requires
further investigation.
For the purpose of our research goals, we began with a
qualitative step to identify the values that are considered
as relevant in each domain. In the second, quantitative,
step, we conducted two domain-specific surveys with
the aim of investigating the evaluation of these values.
Step 1: value identification within two domains
We began by conducting literature reviews, interviews
with experts, and a small survey among various profes-
sionals in Switzerland to identify a) the relevant values
within the respective domain, and b) typical behavioral
manifestations of these values. Using this procedure,
we identified 14 values considered to be important
within the respective domain. These values were not
necessarily “genuinely moral”. The values identified in
this manner in medicine were: autonomy (Autonomie),
care (Fürsorge), cost-effectiveness (Wirtschaftlichkeit),
feasibility (indicating that the physician should do what-
ever is technically possible; technischer Imperativ), honesty
(Ehrlichkeit), integrity (Integrität), justice (Gerechtigkeit),
loyalty (Loyalität), non-maleficence (Nichtschaden), per-
formance (Leistung), professionalism (Professionalität),
reputation (Reputation), respect (Respekt), and respon-
sibility (Verantwortung). The 14 business & finance
values were: engagement (Engagement), competition
(Wettbewerb), compliance (Regelkonformität), fairness
(Fairness), integrity (Integrität), loyalty (Loyalität), non-
maleficence (Nichtschaden), performance (Leistung), pro-
fessionalism (Professionalität), profitability (Profitabilität),
reputation (Reputation), respect (Respekt), responsibility
(Verantwortung), and transparency (Transparenz). As
expected, the values of the two domains only partially
overlapped.
To ensure that participants had a precise and common
understanding of the values, which was necessary for
making an accurate evaluation, each value was presented
with three examples. These examples represented typical
manifestations of the corresponding value in domain-
specific settings and we used domain-specific terms
(‘patients’, ‘customers’, etc.) to adapt the descriptions to
the respective domain. For instance, examples for auton-
omy in medicine were “A person or an institution a) re-
spects the self-determination of others, b) avoids putting
pressure on others to reach goals, and c) supports others
such that they can make their own decisions.” Examples
for profitability in business & finance were “A person or
a company a) tries constantly to optimize the relationship
between revenue and expenditure, b) defines success as
the pursuit of profit, and c) grants a paramount import-
ance to key financial indicators”. Table 1 outlines the
value exemplifications used in our study (German original
and English translation).
We note that the term ‘care’ (Fürsorge) and not
‘beneficence’ was used in the survey, since the German
‘Fürsorge’ is more common than the technical term
‘Benefizienz’. Furthermore, we used general descriptions
of ‘fairness’ and ‘transparency’ for business & finance
that were similar to the descriptions of ‘justice’ and
‘honesty’ in medicine. In other words, the semantics of
these terms overlap, although there is a domain-specific
tradition that, for example, what is considered a matter
of honesty (Ehrlichkeit) in medicine is often a matter
of transparency (Transparenz) in business & finance.
Thus, overall, we had eight values that are commonly
present in both domains and two domain-specific values
that shared a large degree of semantic similarity. As
expected, for the medicine domain, the experts consid-
ered all four principles to be important values; for the
business & finance domain, two out of the four principles
(non-maleficence and justice/fairness) were considered as
relevant.
Step 2: value evaluations within domains
The following investigation was designed to examine the
evaluations of the values identified in the previous step
by conducting two domain-specific surveys.
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Table 1 Value characterization (German original and English translation)
Domain Value Description German Description English
Eine Person oder eine Institution... A person or an institution…
M Autonomie [autonomy] …achtet die Selbstbestimmung Dritter;
…vermeidet die Anwendung von Druck
gegenüber Dritten zur Erreichung von
Zielen; …unterstützt Dritte, so dass diese
eine eigene Entscheidung treffen können
…respects the self-determination of others;
…avoids putting pressure on others to reach
goals; …supports others such that they can
make their own decisions
M Ehrlichkeit [honesty] …kommuniziert einem Patienten
diagnostische Ergebnisse umfassend;
…verschweigt keine negativen Folgen
einer Therapie; …informiert die
Öffentlichkeit über negative Vorfälle in
der eigenen Institution
…communicates diagnostic results to a
patient comprehensively; …does not conceal
risks of therapies; …informs the public about
negative incidents in own institution
B Engagement [engagement] …erledigt Aufgaben mit Begeisterung
und viel Willenskraft; …scheut keine
zusätzlichen Aufwände; …setzt sich für
eine Sache ein
…completes tasks with enthusiasm and
willpower; …does not shy away from
additional efforts…; puts much effort into
a task
B Fairness [fairness] …beurteilt Bewerbungen unter gleichen
Bedingungen; …bevorzugt niemanden
bei Beförderungen; …verzichtet darauf,
einen Informationsvorsprung auszunützen
…evaluates applications equally; …does not
favor someone when it comes to promotion;
…refrains from exploiting an information
advantage
M Fürsorge [care] …hilft Dritten, die in Not sind; …steht
für die Bedürfnisse von leidenden
Menschen ein; …sorgt sich um das
Wohlergehen Dritter
…helps others who are in distress; …protects
the interests of people who are suffering;
…cares about the welfare of others
M Gerechtigkeit [justice] …behandelt Patienten gemäss ihren
Bedürfnissen und nicht gemäss ihrem
Status; …versucht, verschiedene
Standpunkte zu einem Ausgleich zu
bringen; …behandelt Mitarbeitende fair
…cares for patients according to their needs
and not their social status; …tries to balance
different points of view; …treats coworkers
fairly
B & M Integrität [integrity] …lässt sich nicht korrumpieren; …hält
an den eigenen Werten fest; …verdient
Vertrauen
…doesn’t allow him/herself to be corrupted;
…sticks to own values; …earns trust
B & M Leistung [performance] …schätzt Erfolge; …orientiert sich an
den Besten; …misst sich über Ergebnisse
…appreciates success; …orients him/herself
towards the best; …measures oneself based
on results
B & M Loyalität [loyalty] …entlässt keine langjährigen Mitarbeiter;
…ist treu gegenüber der eigenen
Institution; …stellt sich schützend vor
die Mitarbeiter
…does not fire long-time employees; …is
faithful to own institution; …is protective of
his employees
B & M Nichtschaden [non-malefience] …unterlässt riskante medizinische
Interventionen bei zweifelhaften
Erfolgsaussichten; …vermeidet es, bei
einer Therapie einen Patienten zu
schädigen; …minimiert das Leiden
eines Patienten.
…refrains from risky interventions with
dubious prospects of success; …avoids
harming a patient during a treatment;
…minimizes a patient’s suffering
B & M Professionalität [professionalism] …bemüht sich aktiv um die Einhaltung
geltender Gesetze und Standesregeln;
…prüft Patientenanfragen sorgfältig und
gewissenhaft; …erledigt Aufgaben
gründlich
…strives for compliance with laws and rules
of professional conduct; …checks patient
inquiries carefully and scrupulously;
…completes tasks thoroughly
B Profitabilität [profitability] …versucht stets, das Verhältnis von
Einnahmen und Ausgaben zu optimieren;
…beurteilt Erfolg als Erzielen von Gewinn;
…misst finanziellen Kennzahlen eine hohe
Bedeutung zu
… tries constantly to optimize the relationship
between revenue and expenditure; … defines
success as the pursuit of profit; … grants a
paramount importance to key financial
indicators
B Regelkonformität [compliance] …befasst sich mit internen
Verhaltensmassstäben; …prüft die
Einhaltung von internen Regelungen;
…hält sich an offizielle Vorschriften.
…is concerned with codes of conduct;
…checks the compliance with internal rules;
…adheres to official regulations
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Methods
We collected data from two samples through online sur-
veys. In total, 455 participants composed of students and
staff of the University of Zurich (the focus was on med-
ical students, but students of other faculties could also
participate) and members of a network of health profes-
sionals provided data for the medicine survey. Regarding
the business & finance survey, the sample consisted of
333 economics students and staff (most of whom had
work experience in business or finance). This study was
cleared in accordance with the ethical review processes
of the University of Zurich and within the “Ethical
Guidelines for Psychologists of the Swiss Society for
Psychology” (http://www.ssp-sgp.ch/06_pdf/ersgp2003.pdf).
Furthermore, we followed the CHERRIES guidelines (The
Checklist for Reporting Results of Internet E-Surveys; see
http://www.jmir.org/2004/3/e34/) insofar as they were ap-
plicable to the surveys.
Each survey contained two parts. After participants
had provided informed consent, we first assessed demo-
graphic information (gender, age, field of study) and
information about the participants’ work experience in
medicine or business & finance (whether they had work
experience, and what kind of experience). Participants
then rated each value (in a randomized order) along four
dimensions using a 6-point Likert scale (see below). The
participants were able to quit the survey whenever they
wished. The participants who completed the whole survey
were entered into a lottery to win an iPad. After quitting or
after having rated all 14 values, the participants were asked
whether they completed the survey with due diligence (this
is a standard test question in psychological online surveys,
but the answer did not influence whether the participants
were entered into the lottery). Those participants who
stated that they did not complete the survey with due dili-
gence or did not answer the question were excluded from
the data sets. We also compared the time needed to
complete the survey between participants negating or
affirming the due diligence question. Assuming that
individuals who completed the survey with less care
would need less time, we also excluded participants who
responded as quickly as those who stated that they did not
complete the survey with due diligence (this was only the
case for participants who had only rated one single value).
Table 1 Value characterization (German original and English translation) (Continued)
B & M Reputation [reputation] …orientiert ihr/sein Handeln an der
Meinung anderer; …achtet darauf, einen
guten Ruf zu wahren; …ist eine
anerkannte Kapazität auf ihrem Gebiet
…orients his/her behavior to the opinion of
others; …tries to maintain a good reputation;
…is a recognized authority in his/her field
of expertise
B & M Respekt [respect] …akzeptiert individuelle Unterschiede
von Personen; …begegnet Patienten
hochachtungsvoll; …respektiert die
Privatsphäre von andern.
…accepts people’s individual differences;
…encounters patients respectfully; …honors
others’ privacy
M Technischer Imperativ [feasibility] …setzt alle möglichen Mittel für Therapie
und Pflege ein; …sieht die Bewahrung
von Leben als oberstes Gebot an;
…rettet Menschen unter allen Umständen
…uses all possible means for treatment and
care; …considers the saving of life as the
highest priority of all; …saves persons under
any circumstances
B Transparenz [transparency] …kommuniziert offen und ehrlich über
anstehende Veränderungen; …macht
neue Entwicklungen nachvollziehbar für
Dritte; …informiert über Risiken, die aus
ihren Tätigkeiten entstehen können
…communicates openly and honestly about
upcoming changes; …makes new
developments comprehensible for others;
…informs about risks that could result from
own actions
B & M Verantwortung [responsibility] …steht für negative Folgen seiner
Tätigkeiten gerade; …berücksichtigt
Ansprüche der Gesellschaft; …lagert
Risiken nicht aus und nimmt seine
Pflichten wahr
…is answerable for negative consequences
of own actions; …considers demands of
society; …does not shift risks onto others,
and takes his duties seriously.
B Wettbewerb [competition] …steht im Wettstreit mit anderen und
möchte sich durchsetzen; …mag
Konkurrenzsituationen; …möchte
erfolgreicher sein als andere.
…competes with others and wants to assert
him/herself; …likes rivalry; …wants to be
more successful than others
M Wirtschaftlichkeit [cost-effectiveness] …beachtet die Kostenfolgen von
Therapieentscheidungen; …ist sich
bewusst, dass für das Gesundheitswesen
keine unbegrenzten Mittel eingesetzt
werden können; …setzt Mittel
kosteneffizient ein.
…is concerned about the costs of treatments;
…is aware that the available financial resources
for the health system are limited; …uses
means in a cost-efficient way
B: Business & finance, M: Medicine.
The wording of descriptions of values that appear in both domains can be adapted slightly (e.g. “customer” instead of “patient”); in the table, the descriptions
used in the medical domain are shown.
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After this quality check, the samples consisted of 317
participants in medicine (dropout: 30.3%) and 247 par-
ticipants in business & finance (dropout: 25.8%). In the
medicine sample, 71.9% of the participants were female,
their mean age was M = 25.4 years, and 27.4% re-
ported having work experience (24.9% provided de-
tailed descriptions of their profession, e.g. working as
physician or nurse). In the business & finance sample,
54.3% of the participants were female, their mean age
was M = 26.6 years, and 31.6% reported having work
experience (21.9% reported that they currently work
between 50-100% in the business or finance domain).
The over-representation of females in the medicine
survey is mainly explained by the fact that 61% of medical
students in Switzerland are female (final degree, data of
2010; [24]) and that among the professionals, more
nurses than doctors answered the survey.
In the main part of the survey, we assessed the par-
ticipants’ evaluation of the corresponding value along
four dimensions (see Table 2): The “moral – non-
moral” dimension was explicitly described as referring
to universal principles and issues of right and wrong
(MO-NMO) [20]. The “community-oriented – self-
oriented” dimension referred to the social notion of mor-
ality (COM-SELF) [25]. The “cooperative – competitive”
dimension was described as referring to collaborative or
rivalry tendencies between human beings or institutions
(COOP-COMP) [18]. Finally, we added the “principle-
focused – consequentialist” dimension in order to include
a reference to the classic teleological vs. deonto-
logical distinction in ethical theory (PRI-CON). This
also served as a test to examine whether the notions
of autonomy, care (beneficence), non-maleficence and
justice are actually evaluated as “principles” as in the
approach of biomedical ethics; we found no indications
in this regard. Each dimension was rated on a 6-point
scale (1 =moral; community-oriented, cooperative, or
principle-focused; 6 = non-moral, self-oriented, competitive,
or consequentialist).
Results
We will first report the bivariate correlations among the
dimensions, followed by the evaluation of single values
across domains. Finally, we will examine how the values
based on similarity analyses cluster within each domain.
The data were analyzed using the software package
MathematicaW version 9.
Correlational analyses
For each domain, we examined the pairwise Pearson
product–moment correlations among the four dimen-
sions at the aggregated level (across all values) and at
the specific level (for each single value). Table 3 reports
both the findings with the aggregated data, and the
number of values with significant (ps < 0.05) bivariate
correlations. As can be seen from Table 3, the mutual
correlations among dimensions MO-NMO, COM-SELF
and COOP-COMP are about twice as high as the corre-
lations among MO-NMO, COM-SELF, COOP-COMP
and PRI-CON. At the aggregated level: The mean corre-
lations among the first three dimensions in medicine
and business & finance are 0.52 and 0.61, while the
mean correlations of these with the fourth dimension
are 0.25 and 0.34. A similar picture emerges at the spe-
cific level: The mean number of values with significant
correlations among the first three dimensions in medi-
cine and business & finance are 12.3 and 12.7, while the
mean number of values with significant correlations with
the fourth dimension are 5.0 and 5.0. These results dem-
onstrate that the dimensions MO-NMO, COM-SELF
and COOP-COMP are more closely associated among
themselves than with dimension PRI-CON. We thus
conclude that participants tend to associate a “moral
value” with the attributions: universally valid, an issue of
right and wrong, community and cooperation. In con-
trast, a “non-moral value” tends to be characterized by
the features: non-universal, not an issue of right and
wrong, but an issue of self-orientation and competition.
Note that this “moral” versus “non-moral” distinction
Table 2 Dimensions characterizing morality and their description in the survey (English translation)
Dimension Description of left endpoint Description of right endpoint
MO-NMO: moral – non-moral A value is “moral” if it claims to be universally
valid and its corresponding actions are judged
as right or wrong.
A value is “non-moral” if it is not claimed to be
universally valid and if corresponding actions
are not judged as right or wrong.
COM-SELF: community-oriented – self-oriented A value is “community-oriented” if it refers to
the goals of a community, common interest
or the relationships among individuals.
A value is “self-oriented” if it refers to the priority of
personal goals, personal interests or the individual.
COOP-COMP: cooperative – competitive A value is “cooperative” if it refers to the
collaboration, cooperation or communication
between human beings or institutions.
A value is “competitive” if it refers to the
competition or rivalry between human beings
or institutions.
PRI-CON: principle-focused – consequentialist A value is “principle-focused” if it focuses on
the legitimacy of the act itself when the value
is used to evaluate actions.
A value is “consequentialist” if it focuses on the
evaluation of consequences of an action when
the value is used to evaluate actions.
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correlated only weakly with the “principle-focused”
versus “consequentialist” distinction. One reason might
be that, referring to the classic ethical traditions, a moral
value can imply either a deontological or a consequen-
tialist focus. Hence, weaker correlations are likely. We
thus restrict the following cluster analysis to the dimen-
sions MO-NMO, COM-SELF and COOP-COMP.
Evaluation of single values
Table 4 compares the ratings for the single values across
medicine and business & finance (only for the eight
values that were present in both domains). As can be seen,
the analyses revealed significant differences with regard to
five values. When contrasting medicine with business &
finance, loyalty is less moral (dimension MO-NMO);
responsibility is more self-centered (COM-SELF); and
performance is more competitive (COOP-COMP) in
medicine. Reputation and non-maleficence are less “moral”
in medicine across all three dimensions.
Further analyses also revealed differences when con-
trasting participants with work experience to students
without work experience, both in medicine and busi-
ness & finance (data not shown; Mann–Whitney test,
ps < 0.05). Participants with professional experience in
medicine consider loyalty to be significantly less moral
(dimension MO-NMO) and justice to be significantly more
cooperative (COOP-COMP). Participants with professional
experience in business & finance consider engagement to
be significantly more community-oriented (COM-SELF),
reputation to be more non-moral (MO-NMO), self-
centered (COM-SELF) and competitive (COOP-COMP),
and integrity to be more cooperative (COOP-COMP).
Value classification
In a next step, we analyzed the classification of the
values using two similarity metrics and two classification
methods for each dimension MO-NMO, COM-SELF
and COOP-COMP separately. For the similarity metrics,
we used Mann–Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov as
two complementary nonparametric tests (the former has
a higher power for rejecting the null hypothesis, the lat-
ter is more sensitive to the form of the distribution, e.g.,
bimodality). In the first classification method, two values
are considered to be in the same group if the ratings
along one dimension are not distinguishable for one of
the two tests (i.e., ps > 0.05). In the second classification
method, the p-values of the two tests were used to create
a distance matrix for either test (each matrix element is
calculated as 1 minus the p-value of the corresponding
value pair). Either the MW or the KS distance matrix for
one dimension then served as input for a clustering
algorithm that required no predefined specifications on
cluster number and size [26]. In this way, two values X
and Y could be in the same group a maximum of 12
times (3 dimensions × 2 similarity measures × 2 classifi-
cation methods).
This, in turn, resulted in a count matrix in which each
matrix element stands for the number of times the two
associated values have been put in the same group
(Figure 1). The matrix rows can be ordered such that
those values that are frequently grouped together are
neighbors. Finally, these analyses revealed three classes of
values with the following features: class-I (blue) and
class-III (red) values are completely distinct; i.e. values
from class I were never grouped together with values
from class III or vice versa. In contrast, class-II (dark
green) values tend to overlap with the other two classes,
Table 4 Comparing dimension MO-NMO, COM-SELF and
COOP-COMP ratings of values across medicine and
business & finance (*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001)
MO-NMO COM-SELF COOP-COMP
Respect n.s. n.s. n.s.
Loyalty 0.29* n.s. n.s.
Responsibility n.s. 0.33* n.s.
Reputation 0.49** 0.51*** 0.69***
Performance n.s. n.s. 0.38**
Professionalism n.s. n.s. n.s.
Non-maleficence 0.52*** 0.84*** 0.37***
Integrity n.s. n.s. n.s.
Table 3 Pearson product–moment correlation among the four dimensions (*p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001)
Correlated dimensions Medicine (n1 = 317) Business & finance (n2 = 274)
Correlation of
aggregated data
# of values with significant (*)
correlation
Correlation of
aggregated data
# of values with significant (*)
correlation
MO-NMO with COM-SELF 0.41*** 10 0.53*** 10
MO-NMO with COOP-COMP 0.58*** 13 0.63*** 14
COM-SELF with COOP-COMP 0.58*** 14 0.68*** 14
MO-NMO with PRI-CON 0.29*** 7 0.35*** 4
COM-SELF with PRI-CON 0.20*** 5 0.31*** 5
COOP-COMP with PRI-CON 0.24*** 3 0.37*** 6
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i.e. for some combination of dimension, similarity meas-
ure and classification method, a class-II value is grouped
with a class-I value, and for some other combination, it is
grouped with a class-III value.
A closer analysis of the count matrix reveals two ways
of forming these three value groups. Note that class I
(blue) and class III (red) encompass the moral and non-
moral group, respectively. In medicine, and with respect to
grouping option 1, the blue class is composed of the values
respect, loyalty, responsibility and honesty, while autonomy
joins the red class. With respect to grouping option 2, the
blue class is extended by the values care, non-maleficence
and feasibility, while the red class is composed of the
values cost-effectiveness, reputation, and performance. In
business & finance, similar findings are discernible: In
grouping option 1, the blue class is composed of the
values respect, fairness, loyalty, responsibility, and non-
maleficence, while the red class includes the values engage-
ment and professionalism. In grouping option 2, the blue
class is extended by the value integrity, while engagement
and professionalism are excluded from the red class.
Taking the intersection of these two approaches of
analyses reveals a “moral” core and a “non-moral” core for
both social domains, which is partially domain-overlapping
and partially domain-specific. In medicine, the moral core
consists of respect, loyalty, responsibility and honesty; in
business & finance, it consists of respect, fairness, loyalty,
responsibility and non-maleficence. These values have been
classified together in almost all cases. In medicine, the
non-moral core consists of cost-effectiveness, reputation
and performance; in business & finance, it is composed of
the values reputation, competition, performance and prof-
itability. Note that both the moral and non-moral cores
share a high degree of overlap between the medicine and
business & finance domain: respect, loyalty and responsi-
bility for the moral core, and reputation and performance
for the non-moral core.
Strikingly, none of the four values related to the prin-
ciples of biomedical ethics (autonomy, non-maleficence,
care, and justice) fall into the moral core; autonomy
even received consistently low ratings among all three
dimensions, making it almost a class-III value. In con-
trast, in the business & finance domain, two of the four
values that represent the principles – non-maleficence
and fairness – are in the moral core.
The result of the count matrix can also be displayed as
a network, with the size of the edges between two values
reflecting the frequency with which the corresponding
two values have been classified together (Figures 2
and 3). This representation motivates the notion of class-II
values as “bridge values” (marked in green), i.e. these values
can be grouped either with moral or with non-moral values
depending on dimension, similarity metrics and classifica-
tion method. Some “bridge values” have a stronger affinity
to the moral core (marked in turquoise: care, feasibility
and non-maleficence in medicine; integrity in business &
finance), whereas others have a stronger affinity to the
non-moral core (marked in green: autonomy and profes-
sionalism in medicine; engagement and professionalism in
business & finance).
Discussion
We hypothesized that we can characterize the common
morality using three dimensions which have been derived
Figure 1 Count matrix representing how often two values have
been classified in the same group: the darker the entry, the
more often two values have been grouped together (maximum
12 times). Yellow entries indicate values that have never been
classified together; a) count matrix for medicine, b) count matrix for
business & finance. The color bars on the left side indicate the two
grouping options (blue: class-I, green: class-II, red: class-III). Value
abbreviations: AUT = autonomy; CAR = care, CPT = competition,
COM = compliance, CEF = cost-effectiveness, ENG = engagement,
FAI = fairness, FEA = feasibility, HON = honesty, INT = integrity,
JUS = justice, LOY = loyalty, NMA= non-maleficence, PER = performance,
PRO = professionalism, PFT = profitability, REP = reputation,
RES = respect, RPS = responsibility, TRA = transparency.
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from current empirical research in morality. As expected,
we found that these dimensions correlate strongly across
the social domains medicine and business & finance. In
addition, we identified values that form a moral core within
both domains – respect, loyalty and responsibility. These
data are consistent with the notion of a common morality,
i.e. there are values that are perceived as being highly
moral across social domains.
Strikingly, we found that the values associated with
the principles of biomedical ethics are not part of this
moral core. In particular, based on the ratings given
by the participants, it is questionable whether non-
maleficence and in particular autonomy are perceived
as being part of the common morality. Interestingly,
in the business & finance domain, non-maleficence is
part of the moral core, indicating a domain-specificity of
Figure 2 Network representation of the count matrix in medicine. The size of the edge between two values represents how often these
values have been grouped together. Value abbreviations: see caption Figure 1.
Figure 3 Network representation of the count matrix in business & finance. The size of the edge between two values represents how often
these values have been grouped together. Value abbreviations: see caption Figure 1.
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the perceived morality of this value. These findings are
in conflict with the common morality hypothesis of
Beauchamp and Childress. However, they are in line,
for example, with Haidt and Joseph [19], who propose that
innately prepared intuitions generate social-culturally
variable values and virtues.
From the point of view of medical ethics, at first
glance, our finding may be surprising, if not worrying,
because one may consider it to be an indication of a
failure to convey the desired normativity of values to the
professionals who should work with them. Furthermore,
the finding might indicate that the principles – in par-
ticular non-maleficence and autonomy – may not be
grounded in the moral psychology of medical profes-
sionals in the same way as other moral values. This
raises the question of how principles which are inher-
ently not as moral-laden as assumed guide health care
providers in conflict situations to find a helpful – and
for their part “moral” – orientation that would generate
guidance. We believe that to answer this question, one
should analyze the function of the principles in practical
moral decision making. Page [11] found an absence of
predictive power of the principles in decision making,
and concluded that this may be due to the absence of a
behavioral model explaining how individuals cognitively
use these principles in their decision making. According
to our model of moral intelligence, which is proposed
to provide an integrative framework for understanding
moral behavior [27], moral values are, if internalized,
part of the individual’s “moral compass” that helps to
guide behavior. The weaker this grounding is – and
lower “morality ratings” indicate this – the less likely it
is that decision problems are framed as moral problems
and that the corresponding values come into play in the
decision-making process as moral values.
We furthermore suggest that the way in which the
principles are discussed and learned within biomedical
ethics – namely as instruments to deal with dilemmatic
situations – influences to some degree their grounding
in the individual’s moral psychology. If values like non-
maleficence or autonomy are regularly discussed in cases
that involve a conflict between them, it is likely that the
initial appeal of understanding autonomy as “moral” (i.e.,
providing unambiguous action guidance) is weakened. In
this respect, it is interesting that professionals in our
survey consider, for example, loyalty to be significantly
less moral (dimension MO-NMO) compared to the stu-
dents, although loyalty is considered to be among the
moral foundations whose moral psychology has an evo-
lutionary history [19]. As the moral complexity of many
clinical problems can often be understood as conflicts in
loyalties (e.g. between head physician and patient), it is
possible that these experiences weaken the initial moral
appeal of loyalty. That is, the social practice of dealing
with the principles in a specific way in biomedical ethics
(e.g., as instruments to teach ethics to students and
health professionals) may at least to some degree foster
or erode the foundation of the principles in common
morality.
A prediction from our findings is, for example, that –
compared to violations of honesty or respect – medical
professionals will be less likely to quickly identify viola-
tions of autonomy in specific practical clinical problems
as a moral issue (due to the particularly low morality rat-
ings of autonomy). The multiple ways of understanding
autonomy in medical decision problems [28] make such
a prediction plausible.
In addition, our finding is in accordance with some
of the recent critique of principlism raised by other
scholars. For example, Lee [1] discussed the principles
using the distinction between thin and thick concepts,
where ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ both have two different mean-
ings: One possibility is to view the terms based on their
theoretical status: An ethical theory, method or principle
is ‘thin’ in that it covers a theoretical area of morality
but thick in that it provides guidance in practical moral
realms. The other possibility is to view the terms from
the standpoint of content: For example, a theory, method
or principle is thin in that it deals with particular moral
norms/virtues in a minimal sense but thick in that it uti-
lizes a large number of moral norms/virtues includ-
ing their cultural or traditional imprinting. Of course,
these two ways of using thin and thick overlap in many
instances. In the case of principlism, the method is,
according to Lee, thick in status, since the method
deals with practical moral issues, but thin in content,
because it allows different individuals and cultures/
traditions to use the four principles in their own way. In
that sense, principlism would properly work primarily
within Western culture.
In actual fact, our findings indicate an even stronger
undermining of the psychological grounding of the prin-
ciples in the common morality, because even within the
same cultural frame we find that the degree of perceived
morality of a value differs between social domains. The
fact that non-maleficence is unambiguously in the moral
values class in the domain business & finance may indi-
cate that the participants in our study tended to frame
harming a client or business partner as morally bad,
whereas in the medical context, harming a patient is
seen as morally justifiable in some contexts (e.g. in the
case of vaccination or surgery; note that medical inter-
ventions are an incidence of bodily injury from a legal
point of view). Thus, the professional training of medics
requires them to question the primarily moral appeal of
non-maleficence.
Several shortcomings of our study should be noted:
First, we cannot completely rule out that the values
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varied in their generality. That is, the fact that our partic-
ipants gave higher morality ratings to respect, loyalty,
honesty and responsibility over more specific bioethical
principles may simply reflect that some of the former
values may already include some of the more specific
principles. For example, Beauchamp and Childress call
their first principle ‘respect for autonomy’, and the notion
of ‘responsibility’ may already involve a ‘duty of care’.
Nonetheless, if a more specific value is inherently related
to a more general one, we would expect this to also
be reflected empirically in a higher similarity between
these values regarding the various morality dimensions.
In line with this, our results revealed, for example, that
‘responsibility’ is quite strongly associated with care, but
that ‘respect’ is not at all associated with ‘autonomy’ (see
Figure 2). A reason for this could be that the notion
of “respecting a value” can be used for any value term,
i.e. the meaning of “respecting x” is different from the
general understanding of the value ‘respect’. Further-
more, the argument that in our study, some values
were more fundamental that others cannot explain why
there are still, and also domain-specific, differences be-
tween, for instance, loyalty, non-maleficence and justice/
fairness – values for which there are good arguments [19]
that they are generic. Of course, however, further research
is needed to test the replicability and robustness of our
findings.
Second, our approach did not include an intercultural
comparison, which would allow for a more valid ana-
lysis of the common morality hypothesis. This could
be an additional promising extension of this study,
although it needs to be taken into account that the
translations of value descriptions into different languages
would have to be carefully validated in order to avoid
shifts in meaning.
Conclusions
Based on our findings, we can conclude that the princi-
ples of biomedical ethics – in particular autonomy –
have only a weak grounding in human moral psychology
and thus in the common morality. Compared to other
moral values, the principles do not appear to be as
“inbuilt” or internalized values as expected. This might
be unproblematic when people are able to engage in
decision-making processes that involve effortful and
reflective thinking. In such situations, the principles of
biomedical ethics may serve as a useful framework and
means for deliberate moral justifications [29]. Research
has shown that expenditure of cognitive effort is, for
example, more likely under conditions of opportunity
(such as low time pressure or low mental workload).
However, under conditions of lack of opportunity (such
as high time pressure or high mental workload), indi-
viduals are more likely to rely on spontaneous processing,
and therefore on values that are more internalized and
quickly accessible [30]. In such situations, and to the extent
that the principles of biomedical ethics are inbuilt in the
human mind, they are less likely to affect decision making
and behavior. Of course, future studies will have to exam-
ine more thoroughly the extent to which the famous
biomedical principles really do influence moral decision
making and behavior in practical contexts.
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